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Overview 
• Introduction 
• OpenID 
o What is it? 
o How does it work? 
• MSEC’s IdM architecture 
• OpenID shortcomings 
• Approach 
• Implementation 
• Evaluation 
 
 
 
 
The advent of today’s Web 
 
• A myriad of services 
• Countless logins 
 
 
 
• Unreliable user information I’m a banana 
The emergence of Web single sign-on 
• OpenID 
• SAML-based setups 
o Shibboleth 
o Belgian eGov Login 
• Proprietary infrastructures 
o Google 
o Facebook 
o Twitter 
Identity 
provider Service 
providers 
User 
OpenID: what is it? 
• Single sign-on standard 
• Origins: blogosphere, 2005 
• 2007: version 2.0 
• 2009: > 1 billion OpenID-enabled 
accounts 
• Many identity providers: Google, 
Yahoo, Paypal, AOL, Wordpress,… 
OpenID: how does it work? 
User User’s browser Identity provider (IdP) Service provider 
1. Request 
resource 
5. Prompt for authentication 
6. Authenticate 
4. Redirect to IdP 
7. Assert attributes 
and redirect 
8. Return resource 
2. Prompt for IdP URI 
3. Provide IdP URI 
IdP discovery step 
MSEC’s IdM architecture 
• Tamper-resistant module is mediator between 
o identity providers 
o service providers 
• Access to attributes controlled by 
o external authorities: certificates 
o user: personalized policies on the card 
SPi 
IdPX 
OpenID shortcomings: trust 
Before OpenID 
 
 
 
 
 
With OpenID 
Hi, I’m a 
banana. 
Trust me, this 
is a banana 
Identity provider 
Okay. 
Come on in. 
Service provider 
Service provider 
User 
I’m a banana. 
Pass it on. 
User 
Okay 
Okay. 
Come on in. 
OpenID vs. IdM architecture 
OpenID IdM architecture 
Interoperability 
Must modify workstation? Typically not Yes 
Based on a standard? Yes No 
Security 
Credentials 
Passwords: weak ECDH: strong 
Prone to theft by 
malware 
Protected by tamper-
resistant card 
Prone to phishing by SP 
• Feedback about URI 
• Certificate checks 
Communication security 
Data authentication not 
required (MITM attacks) 
Secure, authenticated 
channels 
Identity provider 
Centralised: high-value 
attack target 
Decentralised 
Transaction monitoring, 
linking, profiling 
Mediation by card 
Privacy 
Can impersonate user Mediation by card 
Anonimity level towards 
service provider 
Global user ID (URI) 
• Identifiabile 
• Pseudonymous 
• (Accountably) anonymous 
Selective attribute 
disclosure? 
Typically not Yes 
User consent? Typically not Yes 
Approach: current trends and opportunities 
More mobility & 
more computers 
Smartphones 
omnipresent 
Mobile Internet 
adoption 
Approach: a mobile identity provider 
IdPX 
IdPY 
IdPZ 
User 
Mobile identity provider 
OpenID service 
provider 
7. Retrieve attributes 
from secure element 
Approach: protocol flow 
User User’s browser Service provider 
1. Request resource 
4. Redirect to IdP 
7. Assert attributes 
and redirect 
8. Return resource 
2. Prompt for IdP URI 
3. Provide IdP URI 
Mobile IdP 
5. Show feedback and ask for consent 
6. Give consent and enter PIN 
Implementation 
Mobile device 
• Acer Liquid Glow E330 
• Android 4.0.4 
• I-Jetty webserver 
• Secure element middleware 
Secure element 
• Giesecke & Devrient Mobile Security Card 1.0 
• Java Card 2.2.2 
• MSEC’s IdM architecture 
Service provider 
 
 
Evaluation 
• Better privacy 
• Better security 
• Better interoperability 
• Mobile IdP is personal server… 
o Network anonymity important! 
o Tor 
• Hidden service (*.onion pseudo top-level domain) 
• Tor2web proxy to get a non-Tor URI 
Q&A 
